XSV-1 : Indian ASAT and BMD Capabilities - Past and Future

M0001/DSD03272019/Parth/AMCA239 ***DRAFT-1*** 

Artist's rendition of Kinetic kill Vehicle of XSV zooming toward Microsat-R 

In modern warfare, nearly all aspect of warfighting is dependent on space-based assets. Most satellites stationed in low-earth orbit (LEO) and sun-synchronous orbit (SSO) are usually dual-use in nature i.e. they have both military and civilian application. These satellites are used for navigation, missile launch detection, image intelligence gathering and even locating enemy radars/command-control nodes. Therefore, taking out these satellites would render hostile forces blind and (almost) incapable of firing its long-range cruise missiles.

The USA was the first country ever to demonstrate ASAT capabilities. In 1959 a Bold Orion missile launched from a USAF B-47 passed within 6.5 kilometers of U.S. Explorer-6 satellite at an altitude of 252 km. yeah, 7 kilometers, which is quite enough if you consider the fact that Bold Orion was equipped with a 400 kiloton nuclear warhead. This type of direct ascent ASAT weapons requires a robust tracking and identification system. The Soviet Union started developing its ASAT capabilities in the late 60s. The Soviets developed a "inspect and kill" ASAT i.e. a maneuverable hunter-killer satellite that could chase down a target and destroy it.

In the 60s and 70s, the fear of satellite being used to hide nuclear weapons was the driving force behind ASAT development. The idea (paranoia) was that a satellite carrying nuclear warhead could remain in orbit for years until it is intentionally deorbited over a target. This form of nuclear attack would give minimal (or none at all) reaction time to execute defensive measures. By the end of the cold war, the development of ASAT was driven by the deterrence value of the weapon (and it continues to do so).

BMD, ASAT - Indian Context

XSV-1 ASAT-Breakdown 

The Indian ASAT program has its roots in the BMD program started by Vajpayee's NDA-2 government. India started ballistic missile defense program after the nuclear standoff against Pakistan in 2001-02 (when India was caught with its pants down). Indian attempt to procure Arrow missile defense system from Israel was promptly "shot down" by the USA, thus forcing India to develop its own BMD capabilities. The first major breakthrough in Indian BMD program was the first successful hit-to-kill achieved in November 2012 endoatmospheric interception by Advanced Air Defence (AAD) interceptor Ashwin. India may have achieved the capability to develop an ASAT weapon in 2012 but it was April 2014 when a kill vehicle, similar to the one used in XSV-1 ASAT weapon, was first tested. April 2014 test was followed by three more successful high altitude (100km+) tests (February 2017, September 2018, February 2019). 

A midcourse BMD system and a low altitude ASAT are almost the same. In fact, Most of the direct ascent ASAT weapons are a derivative of Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) interceptors. Furthermore, ballistic missile defense interceptors are more effective as ASAT because satellites are easier to detect, track and engage than warheads, which are usually accompanied by decoys/penetration aids. 

XSV-1 ASAT

DRDO claims that the new missile was codenamed PDV-MK2 for the sake of secrecy but it goes beyond that. The ASAT missile is indeed a derivative of Prithvi Defense Vehicle (PDV) exoatmospheric interceptor. PDV is a midcourse interceptor similar to Arrow-3 of Israel. It is capable of attaining suborbital altitude (~170 km) which is not enough for ASAT role. A larger first stage (most likely a solid rocket booster of one of the missiles from Agni family) was added in order to enhance range and altitude of the missile. The stage-1 booster was selected on the basis of altitude requirement and availability (to reduce development time and cost).

The most sophisticated part of PDV missile is undoubtedly the Kinetic Kill Vehicle (KKV). The KKV is equipped with indigenously (except for the Focal Plane Array, which is French in origin) developed high-resolution cooled Mid-Wave Imaging Infrared (MWIR) Seeker. Relative velocities in a typical midcourse interception are usually higher than Mach 16, therefore KKV features a highly reactive liquid fuel propulsion system i.e.  Divert and Attitude Control System (DACS), which allows the KKV to quickly compensate for variations in intercept path and achieve a direct hit. According to former DRDO chief, V.K. Saraswat, KKV of PDV also features an active radar seeker which works in tandem with IIR seeker in order to enhance target discrimination capability of the KKV. 

Repurposing existing BMD system for ASAT significantly reduced development cost. In the 1980s, development, and induction of  ASM-135 cost USA over $3.5 billion dollars. In contrast, XSV-1 cost India less than $150 million to develop and it was done in a relatively short time. Deploying a fully fledged ASAT system, however, would be an expensive affair. 

Microsat-R that orbited the earth with a delta-v of Mach 26+ was the fastest target ever to be engaged any an India-made KKV. The kill vehicle destroyed the satellite in a head-on collision at an extremely high relative velocity. One of the reasons for the test to be delayed for so long was probably the absence of VC-11184. The radar ship underwent harbor trials last year. The XSV is a direct ascent ASAT weapon, therefore, it's likely that multiple radars were required to acquire the target, predict its trajectory before the actual FCR i.e. LRTR Swordfish guided the missile to predicted interception point. Apart from BMD radars, ISRO's Multi-Object Tracking Radar (MOTR) tracked the satellite (and what remained of it after interception).

Artist's rendition of XSV ejecting heat shield of KKV fairing  (Actual interceptor might not have clamshell fairing)

What does India's ASAT test mean?

India is ready for the big league:
The primary technology the USA uses in its midcourse interceptors (*ASAT/BMD) is a kinetic warhead technology called "hit to kill (H2K)". India used this kind of technology in its XSV-1 ASAT mission and previous exoatmospheric anti-ballistic missile tests. US SM-3 and GMD ballistic missile interceptors are equipped with an H2K warhead. Overall, Operation Shakti proved that Indian BMD program has reached maturity.

• Should Pakistan be worried by this new avatar of Indian BMD shield?
  Yes, and not because Pakistan has no satellites. The new Indian interceptor missile is faster and capable of reaching altitudes in excess of 1000 kilometers. If XSV is used for BMD purpose, India will be able to create a nation-wide BMD shield. Moreover, an XSV BMD battery in the North-Western part of the country will allow India to engage Pakistani ballistic missiles in their ascent phase, thereby reducing the overall BMD system's susceptibility to countermeasures and decoys.
• Assessment of threat to Chinese space assets 
  XSV ASAT weapon (in its current phase of development) is not a threat to Chinese navigation and communication satellites. The BeiDou navigation system consists of satellites in geostationary and medium earth orbit i.e. far out of reach of XSV ASAT (in its existing configuration). XSV, however, can target the bulk of Chinese reconnaissance and electronic intelligence satellites (Yaogan satellite constellation, for instance). A larger first stage or second stage (or combination of both) should allow the kill vehicle to go higher and further.
• Deterrence value of Indian ASAT capability 
  Similar to nuclear weapons, the purpose of the Indian ASAT system is two-fold 
1. Deter threats to Indian space assets 
2. Destroying certain space-assets which are critical for the enemy's warfighting capability. This option, however, should be treated as 'last resort measure'. Any large scale ASAT strike will be met with global outrage because space debris cannot differentiate between friendly or foe space asset.
• Test of technology rather than a system
  The ASAT weapon tested by India on March 27 was, more or less, a demonstration of the technology. There is a long way to go to operationalize the weapon system. To identify and target enemy satellites, India is going to require a system similar to Space Detection and Tracking (SPADATS) that is used to detect, track, and identify objects in space (which is an expensive affair). On a small scale, however, over the horizon target acquisition by ships like VC-11184 might help India to circumvent SPADATS.
  India may continue to test XSV under the guise of BMD test (or simply ASAT point-in-space tests that create no debris cloud). The XSV (in its limited form) might be the cheapest ASAT development to the date, owing to the fact that it makes use of existing BMD infrastructure.

What about space debris created by the ASAT test? 

'The test was done in the lower atmosphere to ensure that there is no space debris. Whatever debris that is generated will decay and fall back onto the earth within weeks.'

USA claimed something similar after Operation Burnt Frost in which US-193 satellite was shot down by an SM-3 missile at an altitude of 234 kilometers in order to "prevent toxic hydrazine fuel of the satellite from presenting a danger in case it survived reentry". The U.S. government argued that the interception was designed in such a way as to minimize the amount of debris. A U.S. government press release said, "nearly all of the debris will burn up on reentry within 24-48 hours and remaining debris should re-enter within 30 days." 

The reality was quite different- It took more than a month for 50% of the debris to reenter and it was only 18 months later when the final piece of debris re-entered the atmosphere. 

The main reason for this was that a large amount of debris was tossed into higher altitude due to the energy of impact. Several pieces of debris were pushed into orbits with apogees above 400 km, and two pieces (the ones that could be tracked) into orbits with apogee above 700 km. 

Considering the fact that the Indian ASAT test involved interception at a relatively high altitude, it's pretty safe to assume that it would be years before the final piece of Microsat-R debris reenters the atmosphere.

Comparison with other ASAT weapons 

The Stanley R. Mickelsen Safeguard Complex Missile Site Radar

1. United States
   Early ASAT systems of the USA were nuclear tipped direct-ascent weapons (both ground and aircraft based) that were designed to pass within a few kilometers of a target and destroy it with a nuclear weapon. In the late 50s and 60s ABM missiles such as Nike-Zeus formed the core of US ASAT capabilities. The Nike Zeus missile was modified into an ASAT weapon under Programme 505.
   
   In the 80s the USA sought to revive its ASAT capabilities as a deterrent to Soviet ASAT program (which were significantly ahead of USA). The USAF's Prototype Miniature Air-Launched Segment resulted in the development of ALMV ( Air-launched Miniature Vehicle). ALMV was an LEO capable direct ascent ASAT interceptor with a maximum ceiling of 563 kilometers (nearly half of India's XSV). ALMV could give US forces the ability to target Soviet surveillance (which also served the role of acquiring targets for Soviet long-range supersonic cruise missile) satellites. originally over 100 ALMV interceptors were planned to be acquired, but the project ran into cost overruns due to technical problems with the homing guidance and delays in testing. ALMV program was canceled in 1988.
   SM-3 and (possibly) GMD, though designed for BMD role, are capable ASAT weapons. Even though the US argued that SM-3 is not an ASAT weapon and that it required special software modification that allowed the missile to track and intercept a satellite (and software was returned to normal after interception). The maximum ceiling of SM-3 missile (utilizing all three stages) is approximately 600 kilometers. Even though XSV outperforms SM-3 as an ASAT weapon, SM-3 has more tactical value as it can be deployed on ships.
   GMD is an anti-ICBM missile system with a maximum ceiling in the excess of 2000 km. The primary role of GMD is to protect high-value assets against attacks. Even though GMD can be an effective ASAT, it wouldn't be wasted on knocking down satellites.
   Finally, X-47B A.K.A Orbital Test Vehicle- Nobody really knows what it does up there but it has all the characteristics of a 'co-orbit' ASAT.
2. China 
   SC-19 Kinetic Kill Interceptor: China started developing SC-19 sometime around 2001-02. In 2005 and 2006, two point-in-space (PINS) tests of the interceptors were carried out. The test conducted on January 11, 2007, resulted in the destruction of dead meteorological satellite Feng Yun 1-C satellite in SSO orbit around 850 kilometers above the earth. The SC-19 is a direct ascent type ASAT based on KT-1 rocket (a modified DF-21). The Booster stage used by SC-19 is significantly smaller than that of XSV. Therefore it is safe to assume that XSV outperforms SC-19 in terms of range and ceiling.
   In 2013, China tested a new direct ascent ASAT called DN-2 (Dongneng) which is capable of targeting satellites in medium earth orbit and higher (where US GPS satellites are stationed). According to Chinese reports, the DN-2 has been derived from a ground-based road-mobile ballistic missile. DN-2 makes China the only country in the world that is capable of destroying GPS navigation satellites.
   China is also pursuing co-orbital ASAT technology. A co-orbit ASAT weapon is a killer satellite that is injected in the orbit which then catches up to its target and destroy it. SY-7 is said to be one such system. Its next iteration, the SY-9 ASAT that was tested in 2015 is a road-mobile system.
   The main advantage of co-orbital ASAT is - unlike direct ascent hit-to-kill ASAT interceptor, co-orbital ASAT cannot be dodged by firing maneuvering thrusters. However, catching up to a target satellite in orbit is a time-consuming process.
3. Russia
   The former Soviet Union started developing its ASAT capability in the 60s. It mainly focused on co-orbital ASAT weapons. After several tests had been carried out, in 1973 USSR ceased further tests stating that it had fully verified co-orbital ASAT capability. Most of these tests were conducted at various altitudes ranging between 150 km to 1600 km.
   Modern Russian ASAT systems include air-launched missile and modified ground-based ABM interceptors. In 1980s Russia developed an air-launch ASAT system called Kontakt. This missile was integrated with Mikoyan MiG-31 supersonic interceptor aircraft. In 2018, a Russian MiG-31 was seen carrying an ASAT missile.
   In 2016, Russia tested a ground-based direct-ascent ASAT weapon called PL-19 Nudol. It is a kinetic kill weapon based on A-235 ABM system. It can hit targets in orbit to 800 kilometers above the earth. 

Some questions you might have -  

1. Will India conduct more ASAT tests?
   Yes, and No. Future tests might be point-in-space (PINS) type test or disguised as ABM test. PINS tests don't have a real target, the interceptor missile just has to pass through a pre-designated area in space (electronic target). 
2. What about the international treaty for a ban on ASAT weapons?
   ASAT and ABM system has the same requirements and method to detect, track and intercept their targets. An exoatmospheric ABM system is also a potent ASAT system (with slight modifications). Given the fact that rogue nations like North Korea and Pakistan have nuclear weapons, and means to deliver them, ABM systems cannot be scrapped. 
3. Does it give India the capability to engage and destroy Chinese/Pakistani long-range missiles? A rule of thumb in BMD is that the higher you try to engage a ballistic missile, the better your chances to kill it will be (but it mostly depends on the ability of the said ABM interceptor to discriminate between a real warhead and decoys/countermeasures). Further enhancement in the kill vehicle technology will allow India to miniaturize it. Thereby, allowing a single interceptor to carry multiple kill vehicle. 
4. How can India protect its satellites from hostile ASAT weapons?
   To protect its space assets India will have to enhance its space surveillance and missile launch detection capabilities. If a direct-ascent ASAT missile is detected early, there is a good chance that target satellite may evade it by firing maneuvering thrusters.
   Most of the new Indian satellites (Cartosat family, for instance) in LEO are said to be agile i.e. they can be steered quickly in order to capture images of a particular area on a priority basis.
   A co-orbital ASAT weapon can be intercepted by our own ASAT interceptor. Instead of large, more capable expensive satellites, clusters of multiple smaller satellites should be given priority.

Artists' rendition of XSV-1 approaching Microsat-R

Follow-up read : 
Indian BMD Radar: Present and Future Development 
Indian Space Based Electronic Intelligence capability 

Emergency Satellite Launch Capability Under Making

Missile Tracking/ Space Surveillance Ship
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